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“FIRM OFFERS” UNDER UCC
SECTION 2-205 SHOULD BE TREATED
THE SAME WAY AS ARE OFFERS
INCLUDED IN OPTION CONTRACTS
Gregory Scott Crespi*
ABSTRACT
“Firm offers” under Section 2-205 of the Uniform Commercial Code are
irrevocable for a period of time in accordance with the terms of that provision.
But should those statutorily irrevocable offers be treated the same way as offers
that are included in option contracts, and that are thereby contractually
irrevocable, for the application of the “death or legal disability of the offeror”
doctrine, or the “rejection or counteroffer” rules, or the “mailbox rule”? Or
should firm offers be treated in a different fashion, as are offers not included in
option contracts, for those purposes? This article argues that firm offers should
be treated in the same way as are offers included in option contracts for those
purposes.
*

*

*

When I teach contract law to first-year law students, I initially cover some
introductory material regarding law school and legal practice. I then discuss in
some detail the classical principles governing offers, after which I introduce
students to one of the mid-twentieth century abridgments of these classical
principles, Section 2-205 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), a provision
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which has been adopted by almost all of the states.1 That section is titled “Firm
Offers” and limits the freedom of persons qualifying as “merchants” under the
UCC to revoke their offers if the offers have been made through a “signed
writing,” and if those offers give assurances that they will be held open for a
period of time.2 This provision makes those offers irrevocable for that period of
time, subject to some qualifications.3 Those offers, in effect, create option
contract rights for the offerees to accept the offer at any point during that time
period despite the lack of a contractual agreement.4
The interesting question that the more insightful and inquisitive students often
raise when they are introduced to UCC Section 2-205 is whether offers
qualifying as firm offers, which have the key irrevocability property of an offer
that is included in an option contract,5 are regarded as offers included in option
contracts for all other legal purposes? In particular, do these firm offers survive
the death or legal disability of the offeror, which offers generally do not,6 but
which those offers included in option contracts do,7 and do they survive if
rejected (or counter-offered to) by the offeree, which again offers generally do

1. Henry Mather, Firm Offers Under the UCC and the CISG, 105 DICK. L. REV. 31, 34
(2000) (“The 1962 Official Text of the UCC, enacted as statutory law in most states, includes a
firm offer rule in section 2-205.”).
2. SECTION 2-205. FIRM OFFERS
An offer by a merchant to buy or sell goods in a signed writing which by its
terms gives assurance that it will be held open is not revocable, for lack of
consideration, during the time stated or if no time is stated for a reasonable
time, but in no event may such period of irrevocability exceed three months,
but any such term of assurance on a form supplied by the offeree must be
separately signed by the offeror.
U.C.C. § 2-205 (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 1977).
3. Id.
4. After introducing students to UCC Section 2-205, I then spend several weeks discussing
the common law development of several other limitations on the classical freedom of offerors to
revoke their offers. These limitations are now embodied by Sections 45, 86, 87(2), and especially
Section 90 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§§ 45, 86, 87(2), 90 (AM. L. INST. 1981).
5. I will throughout this article refer to offers made irrevocable by their inclusion in an option
contract relationship as “offers included in an option contract,” rather than by the more succinct
phrase “option contract offers,” so as to avoid possible confusion between an irrevocable offer
contained in an option contract and a revocable offer made to someone to encourage them to enter
into an option contract. See supra p. 285; see also infra p. 286–90.
6. SECTION 48. DEATH OR INCAPACITY OF OFFEROR OR OFFEREE
An offeree’s power of acceptance is terminated when the offeree or offeror
dies or is deprived of legal capacity to enter into the proposed contract.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 48 (AM. L. INST. 1981).
7. SECTION 37. TERMINATION OF POWER OF ACCEPTANCE UNDER OPTION CONTRACT
Notwithstanding §§ 38–49, the power of acceptance under an option contract
is not terminated by rejection or counter-offer, by revocation, or by death or
incapacity of the offeror, unless the requirements are met for discharge of a
contractual duty.
Id. § 37.

COPYRIGHT © 2022 SMU LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

2022]

“FIRM OFFERS” UNDER UCC SECTION 2-205

287

not,8 but which those offers included in option contracts do?9 And finally, are
acceptances of such firm offers effective only when received, as are acceptances
of offers included in option contracts under Restatement (Second) of Contracts
Section 63(b),10 rather than effective when sent under the Section 63(a) mailbox
rule that usually applies to acceptances unless the offer states otherwise?11
The broader issue giving rise to these several specific questions is that since
firm offers are not offers included in option contracts—in fact they are not part
of contractual agreements at all but are simply offers that have been made
irrevocable by statutory decree—should they be regarded as though they were
offers included in option contracts for other purposes as well, or should they
instead be treated like any other offers in all ways except for their statutorily
mandated irrevocability?
I have until now in my teaching gone with my intuitions here and have told
my students that courts will probably treat Section 2-205 firm offers the same
way they do offers included in option contracts for all purposes, including with
regard to the several subtle issues that I have here raised. But I have now decided
to look into these questions more fully to see if I have been giving correct advice
all of these years.
I have unfortunately found very little case law regarding this general question
as to whether firm offers under UCC Section 2-205 should be regarded the same
way as offers included in option contracts for all purposes.12 The few opinions
that address this classification issue do so only briefly in passing,13 and I have
found no case law authority at all regarding the more specific questions of
whether the option contract exceptions to the common law death of the offeror
8. SECTION 36. TERMINATION OF THE POWER OF ACCEPTANCE
An offeree’s power of acceptance may be terminated by
(a) rejection or counter-offer by the offeree . . .
Id. § 36(1)(a).
9. See supra note 6.
10. SECTION 63. TIME WHEN ACCEPTANCE TAKES EFFECT
Unless the offer provides otherwise, (a) an acceptance made in a manner and
by a medium invited by an offer is operative and completes the manifestation
of mutual assent as soon as it is put out of the offeree’s possession, without
regard to whether it ever reaches the offeror; but (b) an acceptance under an
option contract is not operative until received by the offeror.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 63.
11. Id.
12. The limited case law authority here is terse and ambivalent. See Bethlehem Steel Corp. v.
Litton Indus., Inc., 488 A.2d 581, 592 (Pa. 1985) (“The firm offer which Code § 2-205 makes
irrevocable . . . has a different character than the option contract recognized at common law.”); cf.
Chicago Fineblanking Corp. v. D.J. Cotter & Co., No. 95-CV-71666-DT, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
21882, at *13 (E.D. Mich. May 22, 1996) (“[S]uch an obligation [created by an offer under UCC
Section 2-205] is simply an enforceable option contract.”); Sun Refin. & Mktg. Co. v. Spelman,
No. 63164, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 6421, at *7 n.2 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 17, 1992) (“We consider
it necessary to note that under the Uniform and Commercial Code a seller can offer a buyer an
option contract by making an irrevocable offer . . . See U.C.C. § 2-205.”); Fordham v. Eason, 521
S.E.2d 701, 706 (N.C. 1999) (“[U]nder the Uniform Commercial Code, certain option contracts
can remain open without consideration, see [UCC § 2-205] . . . .”).
13. See Bethlehem Steel Corp., 488 A.2d at 592; Chicago Fineblanking Corp., 1996 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 21882, at *13; Spelman, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 6421, at *7 n.2; Fordham, 521 S.E.2d
at 706.

COPYRIGHT © 2022 SMU LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

288

SMU LAW REVIEW FORUM

[Vol 75

doctrine, or to the rules regarding rejection of offers or counteroffers, or to the
mailbox rule, apply to firm offers.
There is also only a very modest amount of informed commentary on these
questions. The Official Comment to Section 2-205 unfortunately does not
provide any useful clarification.14 The usually authoritative White & Summers
treatise on the Uniform Commercial Code also provides no assistance.15 The
discussion of Section 2-205 in Corbin on Contracts also does not address these
particular classification issues.16
The Murray on Contracts treatise does briefly address these issues, although
very generally and indirectly, when it ambivalently states that offers made
subject to Section 2-205 “may be viewed as option contracts in terms of their
effect.”17 But that treatise does not opine when this should be done; if it is
regarded as a matter of judicial discretion, as Murray’s choice of the word “may”
suggests; and, if so, whether all or only some aspects of the law regarding offers
included in option contracts should be applied to firm offers. Calamari and
Perillo on Contracts tersely states that the “supervening death . . . of the offeror
or offeree does not terminate an irrevocable offer” made under Section 2-205
but does not offer a rationale for extending this option-contract-based principle
to firm offers, nor address the other questions here posed.18 And while E. Allan
Farnsworth in his well-known one-volume Contracts treatise states that it is
“less clear” that an offer under Section 2-205 will survive rejection by the
offeree than will an offer that is included in an option contract, and provides
some limited support for this position,19 he does not address these other
questions I have posed.
There is also very modest journal literature published in the early years after
the promulgation of Section 2-205 that focused primarily on what impact this
new provision was likely to have, if any, on the construction industry
controversies that gave rise to the extension of the promissory estoppel doctrine

14. Comment 3 to Section 2-205 states that “[t]his section deals only with the offer which is
not supported by consideration,” which makes clear that the provision has no applicability to offers
included in option contracts, but does not address whether offers made under that section are to
have any other features of offers included in option contracts beyond the irrevocability of the offer.
U.C.C. § 2-205 cmt. 3 (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 1977).
15. See 1 JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 52–54 (3d
ed. 1988).
16. 1 TIMOTHY MURRAY, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 2.26 (Matthew Bender, 2022).
17. JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 44(C)(7) (5th ed. 2011).
18. JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS 102 (6th ed. 2009).
19. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 179 (4th ed. 2004). However, the support for this
claim that Farnsworth offers is primarily limited to a 1953 Michigan case and to a Restatement
(Second) of Contracts Section 37 illustration that each relate to rejections of offers included in
option contracts—not to firm offers under UCC Section 2-205. See id. at 179 n.25. He does,
however, also refer to a principle he claims is embraced by both the Vienna Convention and the
UNIDROIT Principles (that “even an irrevocable offer” would be terminated by the offeror’s
rejection), which he opines would probably not apply to offers included in option contracts. Id. This
suggests different treatment under the Vienna Convention between these two types of irrevocable
offers in this regard. Id.
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to commercial relationships.20 But that literature dealt broadly only with the core
irrevocability aspects of offers made under Section 2-205 and did not address
the more technical questions here considered. There are also a couple of later
articles focusing primarily on Section 2-205,21 but neither of those articles
address the general question of whether firm offers under that provision should
be regarded as offers included in option contracts for all purposes.
So, while I admittedly have found very little on-point guidance here, let me
offer my thoughts regarding these questions. The rationale for having offers
included in option contracts survive the death or legal disability of the offeror is
quite clear and compelling. Otherwise, the offeree could not have confidence
that they would have the full option contract period to decide whether to accept
the offer. One would think that the drafters of the UCC and the state legislatures
that enacted Section 2-205 into law would want offerees to whom firm offers
have been made to have the same confidence in the endurance of those offers as
would offerees of offers included in option contracts. I therefore strongly favor
regarding firm offers as equivalent to offers included in option contracts with
regard to the consequences of the death or legal disability of the offeror,
enduring despite those circumstances, and I think that most, if not all, courts
would agree with me here.
The rationale for having offers included in option contracts survive rejections
or counteroffers by the offeree is far less compelling, since the offeree has full
control over these actions on their part. One commentator in particular, Michael
J. Cozzillio, wrote an extensive article that takes sharp issue with this position
and argues that such actions by the offeree should terminate the offeree’s option
contract rights.22 However, despite this criticism, protection against offer
termination by rejection or counter-offer is now provided by courts to offerees
for offers included in option contracts as a general matter.23 Given this current
judicial practice, I do not see any obvious reason why that same protection
should then not also be provided to offerees under Section 2-205, although I
agree with Cozzillio that the justification for providing this particular protection
to offerees of offers included in option contracts is relatively weak.24 And I can
also see how Farnsworth could have come to the conclusion that this relatively
weak justification would make the rationale for the extension of that protection
to Section 2-205 offerees “less clear,” particularly given his stated view that
courts applying the international law Vienna Convention and UNIDROIT
Principles to a dispute would likely treat these firm offers differently in this
regard.25 Nevertheless, I still favor providing such protection to offerees under
firm offers, so as to conform to the practice followed for offers included in
20. See, e.g., J.C.C., Jr., Another Look at Construction Bidding and Contracts at Formation,
53 VA. L. REV. 1720 (1967); Franklin M. Schultz, The Firm Offer Puzzle: A Study of Business
Practice in the Construction Industry, 19 U. CHI. L. REV. 237 (1952).
21. Mather, supra note 1; Michael J. Cozzillio, The Option Contract: Irrevocable Not
Irrejectable, 39 CATH. U.L. REV. 491 (1990).
22. Cozzillio, supra note 21, at 554–55.
23. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 37 (AM. L. INST. 1981).
24. See Cozzillio, supra note 21.
25. FARNSWORTH, supra note 19, at 179 n.25.
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option contracts, in order to avoid confusion, and I think that most—but perhaps
not all—courts would agree with me here.
The rationale for having an exception to the mailbox rule for acceptances of
offers included in option contracts is much more convincing, although somewhat
more complex. One obvious justification commonly advanced is that the offeree
does not need the security provided by the mailbox rule of knowing that the
contract has been formed once they have put their acceptance into the mail, since
the offer is contractually irrevocable and contract formation will occur once the
acceptance is received, so long as it is received during the option contract
period.26 The offeree under an option contract can, if necessary, take steps to
confirm that their acceptance has been received in a timely manner.27 They do
not need mailbox rule protection against offer revocation during the option
contract period while the acceptance is in transit since they already have that
protection provided by their option contract rights.28
A second justification often advanced for this exception from the mailbox rule
is that the offeror in an option contract may need to know if a contract has
already been formed when the option contract period expires. Otherwise, they
would be unable to make other binding arrangements at that time if they wanted
to do so in order to no longer bear the risk of adverse price movements. But if
the mailbox rule were to apply to form a contract when the acceptance was put
into the mail, which may not arrive until after the termination of the option
contract period, if at all, this would leave the offeror uncertain if they were
already contractually committed at the time that the option contract period
expired—an unfair result.
Even if one accepts the somewhat problematic rationale for the application of
the mailbox rule to ordinary offers, which rule allocates the risk of non-delivery
of the acceptance to the offeror rather than the offeree (which is probably an
inefficient risk allocation in terms of the relative costs to the offeror and offeree
of monitoring delivery of the acceptance in most instances29) it does not appear
justified to apply this principle to offers included in option contracts which do
not raise similar concerns for offerees. As evidenced by Restatement (Second)
of Contracts Section 63(b), the courts have not done so with respect to offers
included in option contracts.30
One would think that the drafters of the UCC and the state legislatures that
enacted UCC Section 2-205 into law would want offerors who have made firm
offers under UCC Section 2-205 to similarly have the assurance that they could
not be contractually committed under the mailbox rule prior to their receiving
notice of acceptance of their offer, so that they would know where they stood
contractually at the time of expiration of the option contract. And just as for

26. See PERILLO, supra note 18, at 100–103.
27. See id.
28. See generally id. (citing some cases in support).
29. One would think that since the offeree knows when and by what means of delivery the
acceptance has been sent, and the offeror may not, the offeree would in general be the lower cost
monitor of the delivery of the acceptance.
30. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 63(b) (AM. L. INST. 1981).

COPYRIGHT © 2022 SMU LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

2022]

“FIRM OFFERS” UNDER UCC SECTION 2-205

291

offers included in option contracts, the offerees do not need the protection during
the period of irrevocability against offer revocation that the mailbox rule
provides for ordinary offers. I therefore also strongly favor regarding firm offers
as equivalent to offers included in option contracts in that the acceptances will
be effective only when received. I believe that most, if not all, courts would
agree with me here if presented with this issue.
Based on my review of this limited body of guidance and upon my reasoning
regarding the wisdom of applying the various rules formulated for offers
included in option contracts to firm offers under Section 2-205, I will therefore
continue to explain to my students that these firm offers should be regarded in
the same way as are offers included in option contracts for death or legal
disability of the offeror, rejection of the offer or counteroffer, or mailbox rule
purposes, even though they are not actually offers included in option contracts.
I think that most, if not all, courts would likely agree if presented with any of
those questions. These conclusions have a solid rationale despite there being a
relative lack of specific case law authority or supportive legal commentary on
these points. But I will continue to keep an eye out for additional cases or
commentary that might explore these issues more fully and that might suggest
the need for a more nuanced application of option contract principles to firm
offers.

